

*Review*

# A Diplomatic Approach to Crime Control in Cape Town: NGO Diplomacy and Organized Crime

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Abstract

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South Africa's Cape Flats exist with parallel structures of criminal and state authority. Unemployment and poverty are two major socioeconomic determinants leading Black and coloured community members to gangsterism. Ceasefire, a local NGO, adopts innovative social crime prevention and public health approaches to crime in Cape Town's Hanover Park diplomatically. Social crime prevention focuses on the social, economic, and environmental drivers of gangsterism. These evidence-based practices prove successful in Hanover Park but conflict with special interests in South Africa's competitive party system. State actors actively undermine Ceasefire's initiatives with dire consequences on peace and development for Cape Town's severely marginalized and neglected communities. The state zealously favours militarized and punitive approaches in crime control, and the politics of crime in South Africa renders Ceasefire a politically unattractive model. However, holistic approaches, such as Ceasefire's methodology, are necessary to meaningfully transform the lives and opportunities for those submerged in gangsterism.

**Keywords:** Diplomacy, Gangsterism, Guerrilla diplomacy, NGO diplomacy, Organized crime, Social crime prevention

## INTRODUCTION

Organized crime is traditionally characterized as a social virus with a parasitic relationship to the state's decay and socioeconomic retreat (Leander, 2001). Standing (2006) coined "criminal governance" as a concept to interpret organized crime's deeper incorporation into society's socioeconomic fabric and gaps in formal governance. South Africa's Cape Flats exist with parallel structures of criminal and state power under pluralistic forms of authority (Goredema and Goga, 2014). Reliance on criminal networks has become a rational response for survival and self-help in reaction to failed social welfare and economic management by the state in South Africa

(Hall and Biersteker, 2002). And while militarized and repressive police approaches are often-sought strategies to combat organized crime, new and emerging practices in diplomacy can offer an innovative path forward.

Non-governmental organizations (NGOs) and citizen-based diplomacy present opportunities for the state to connect with Cape Flat's marginalized communities. This is vital because Cape Town is socially and spatially one of the most segregated cities globally, seemingly headed towards a "new apartheid" (Lemanski, 2004; McDonald, 2009). The World Economic Forum's (2019) Global Risks Report notes that "rising income and wealth disparity"

and “increasing polarization of societies” are major drivers of “profound social instability.” South Africa is the most economically stratified state globally, with a Gini coefficient of 63 in 2014 (World Bank, 2014). NGO diplomacy as micro-level institutions with emergency response and outreach capacity plays a pivotal role between organized crime and society. These NGOs, such as Ceasefire, coordinate community-based security governance and work to address the structural and causal drivers of poverty, gangsterism, and insecurity in the Cape Flats. Recent political overtures to delegitimize Ceasefire are politically motivated and counterproductive to reducing crime and lifting Cape Flat’s residents out of gangsterism. The African National Congress’s (ANC) investigations and defunding of Ceasefire move contrary to the program’s success and speak to the politics of crime in South Africa interfering with succeeding evidence-based practices.

This paper begins by outlining the theory of NGO governance and diplomacy, situating a restorative justice lens on nodal governance and polylateral diplomacy between state and non-state actors. Situating governance from below in a non-threatening position to state authority is critical in seeking cooperation and efficiency. Zwelethemba’s community-based security governance model is reviewed to demonstrate the theory. Hereafter, an examination of criminal governance, its historical roots, and contemporary evolution in South Africa’s Cape Town serves as the basis of NGO diplomacy in the Cape Flats. This feeds into South Africa’s politics of crime and policing evolution in the post-apartheid era. The final section examines Ceasefire in Cape Flats’ Hanover Park neighbourhood. Ceasefire’s methodology and practice show the potency and efficacy of NGO diplomacy to apparently intractable circumstances.

## Diplomatic Theory

The drivers of insecurity and poverty have historical roots and contemporary dynamics intertwined in long-held grievances. A restorative justice lens helps frame the role and direction of NGO and citizen-based diplomacy. Restorative justice seeks a future-focused perspective on the community while devolving problem-solving and decision-making power back to the people (Froestad and Shearing, 2013; Marshall, 1999). The objective is to return ownership of the conflict to society while supporting self-determination, avoiding the tendency of blaming and punishment (Christie, 1977; Crawford and Newburn, 2003). The restorative process seeks to repair harm in a non-oppressive manner while creating networks of relationships to prevent and address the

drivers of conflict and grievance.

A restorative justice approach requires an expanded understanding of governmentality beyond notions of governance from above and state authorities. Foucault’s (1991) definition of governmentality serves this purpose:

[t]he ensemble formed by the institutions, procedures, analyses and reflections, the calculations and tactics that allow the exercise of this very specific albeit complex form of power, which has as its target population, as its principle form of knowledge political economy, and as its essential technical means apparatuses of security (102)

It is essential to distinguish the difference between power and authority from this definition: authority is understood by its legitimate, uncoerced, and recognized claim from the community, compared to power which is forced (Hall and Biersteker, 2002). NGOs and community-based governance can capitalize on their community-derived moral authority and translate it into regulatory authority (Kratochwil, 2016). The social systems these non-state actors occupy are part of pluralistic modes of governance captured in “nodal governance”: the interactions of actors creating networks that govern the spaces they inhabit (Burriss et al., 2005). Most importantly, shared spaces of governance are about calculated cooperation and networks, not diminishing the state’s social control (S. Cohen, 1989).

A prominent example of rising nodal governance is found in international environmental negotiations and politics. The increasing role of environmental NGOs is primarily due to the enormity and complexity of international cooperation in climate governance since the 1980s (Princen and Finger, 1994). Specifically, NGOs can operate in global spaces of social relations while working on community projects to advance and represent the interests of unrepresented sub-state groups (Pincen, 1994). NGOs’ capacity to operate in global relations and local spaces increases the regularity of NGO participation and influence in international negotiations (M. Betsill, 2008).

Emerging diplomatic practices are immersing in this nodal framework of governance while revolutionizing diplomatic applications, specifically, in reorienting from club to network diplomacy with citizens and non-state actors in policy processes and application (Heine, 2013). Traditional Track I state-oriented diplomatic practices are constrained by material and ideological structures (Adler-Nissen, 2016). Track II diplomacy incorporates non-state actors in concertation with state-based activities, permitting NGOs to operate in a non-structured method to address the contextual and underlying needs of conflict (Davidson and Montville, 1981). Meanwhile, citizen diplomacy is a bottom-up society-centric approach with individuals utilizing their skills to build bridges and mitigate community discord (Fulda, 2019). Together this

sets the foundation for a diplomatic ecosystem with “guerilla diplomats”: characterized as responsive, self-sufficient, and resilient agents adaptive to contextual dynamics (Copeland, 2009). And although there are few examples, the Zwelethemba Model is one such NGO operating in the guerilla diplomat’s terrain. Guerilla diplomacy allows diplomatic responses of dialogue, negotiation, and collaboration to be used in Gunaratne’s (2005) interpretation of diplomacy as a “theory of living systems”: non-linearity, interconnectedness, and the multidimensional interplay of cause and effect. Most importantly, Wisemans’ notion of “polylateralism” as diplomacy’s third dimension allows space for recognition without sovereignty between state and non-state actors working in shared systems of power dynamics (2004, 2010). These conceptions of practice are central to addressing parallel structures of criminal and state governance to deliver public services and programs sustainably while responsive to community and individual needs.

### **Zwelethemba Model and Guerilla Diplomacy**

In South Africa, this is evident in NGOs coordinating community-based conflict resolution schemes in community crime reduction partnerships (Dupont et al., 2003). Notably, this allows NGOs to help the state address issues beyond its capacity and constraints (Langhorne, 2005), such as the Zwelethemba Model. NGOs can harness local capacity and knowledge to govern security through a network of micro-level institutions on a consensual foundation. The Zwelethemba project showcases an NGO operating in tandem with local law enforcement and the wider criminal justice system as an example of nodal governance between state and non-state actors in shared systems of power.

The Zwelethemba project’s theoretical foundation comes from a security governance pilot project between the Metropolitan Toronto Housing Authority and the University of Toronto’s Centre of Criminology work on the pluralization of security governance. Clifford Shearing, from the Centre of Criminology, and John Swell, the housing authority Chairperson, designed gatherings of authority staff and tenants involved in local security issues to find plausible solutions within the participants’ capacities and context (Shearing and Froestad, 2010). The number of attendees and who participated was context-dependent and allowed the gatherings to bypass existing bureaucratic requirements with an allocated governance budget for implementation (Ibid.). The project’s reliance on local capacity and knowledge through community gatherings is the basis on which

the Zwelethemba project was adopted in South Africa.

Shearing soon met with Dullah Oma, the then South African Minister of Justice, regarding the apartheid regime’s neglect of communities and their growing insecurity. The Community Peace Programme (CPP) was then formed out of the University of Western Cape to build a network of Peace Committees in the Zwelethemba township of 20,000 residents living in formal and informal settlements (Ibid.). The CPP adopted the Toronto Housing Authority’s gathering template to transform security through participatory governance (Shearing, 2001). An experimental period of trial and error resulted in forming a network of peace committees known as gatherings. These gatherings consist of the disputants, varying community members, and authority figures; the parties engage in a deliberative process to reach a consensual agreement (Roche, 2002). Disputants can choose to bring their cases to the police or a Peace Committee, with cases often being shifted between them and at times being run concurrently (Shearing and Froestad, 2010). The CPP notes that cases are on average seen within five days of the incident, in contrast to delays of up to a year in other restorative justice programs (Roche, 2002).

These Peace Committees operated on four pillars resulting in their efficacy and legitimacy in the community. The first is returning ownership of conflict to the disputants and community stakeholders in a deliberative process without pre-determined outcomes (Froestad and Shearing, 2005). The second is to avoid the crime-constructed offender/victim binary. In several cases, there is a history of conflict between the parties where the offender and victim’s role is non-static, so disputants are referred to as “parties” to disassociate any prejudgement (Froestad and Shearing, 2007a). The third is the Peace Committee’s focus on the underlying roots or structural factors contributing to conflict (Gerits, 2005). The final factor is the Committee’s future orientation to provide forward-looking solutions through a legitimately community-derived process (Wood and Shearing, 2007). These four pillars are part of the CPP’s success leading to the formulation of action plans in 96% of the 14,000 gatherings held before 2005 (Froestad and Shearing, 2005). The CPP predominantly addressed issues relating to money lending, property offences, domestic violence, assault, and substance abuse. CPP Exit surveys of participants revealed almost a 95% satisfaction rate with the peacemaking process (Froestad and Shearing, 2007b). Despite the model’s relative success, Dixon (2004) notes the challenges to upscaling the process and problems faced in communities to mobilize scarce resources for resolutions while not conflicting with the law. Despite these challenges, the project reflects the possibility of building a future-focused model of local




Figure 1. Incorporation and expansion from Hall and Thomas Biersteker(2002) and Lambrechts (2012)

conflict resolution while working in a nodal approach to security governance with the broader criminal justice system.

### Organized Crime in the Cape Flats

Ceasefire’s operations espouse similar principles to the CPP’s Zwelethemba model but operate differently and in a different power context given Ceasefire’s focus on organized crime. Figure 1 diagrams some of the Cape Flats’ core elements affecting systems of local power dynamics, public sectors, and drivers of instability. Drivers of insecurity and vulnerability underlie local power systems between the state, NGOs, community actors, and criminal society. In turn, these nodes of governance affect various policy and public sectors. However, the reversing red arrows reveal the non-linear play between causes and effects that re-emerge in local power systems.

Conventional notions of organized crime limit the activity to an “uncivil society” whose goal is to “obtain money through illegal activities, often surviving on fear and corruption” (Annan, 2000; Bresler, 1994). However,

expanding the lens of perception reveals organized crime extends well into the “grey” or informal areas of social, economic, and political control (Davis, 2006). Criminal networks become embedded in the socioeconomic fabric as part of a pluralistic system of power, where “criminal governance” is distinct from “criminal entrepreneurs” (Lea, 2002; Giustozzi, 2003). Governance from below rises with quasi-legality from beneath as a parallel order to the state (Stensen, 1999). And although not a substitute for formal authority, criminal governance fills capacity gaps and functional holes left from a failing and mistrusted state.

The Cape Flats were created as a dumping ground for forced removals of Black and communities of colour from Cape Town’s inner city during the apartheid era under the Groups Areas Act in the 1960s and 70s (Gastrow, 1998). This began the deep-root socioeconomic problems feeding into perpetual unemployment and poverty as a structural problem. However, even the collapse of the apartheid regime did not demolish apartheid’s domination and resistance (Pillay, 2008). Criminal violence replaced the civil war that never happened, and the survivors of apartheid were rebranded as Cape Town’s problem (Marais, 2001; Jensen, 2008). This culminates into what




Figure 2. Data Source: South Africa Police Services, 2020




Figure 3. Data Source: World Bank (2014), Licensed Under CC BY 4.0

Du Toit (2003) brands a “crime generating society” where trust and confidence in the social order and the state have collapsed.

Economic exclusion and failing social welfare programs combined with distrust of the state exacerbate poverty and force crime as a rational self-help alternative to deteriorating social conditions. The UN Office on Drugs and Crime estimates South Africa’s murder rate to be 36 per 100,000 people, making it the tenth-highest murder rate per country, and Cape Town is ranked the eleventh most murderous city in the world (World Bank, 2017; The Economist, 2020). Furthermore, the World Health Organization ranks South Africa’s murder rate for women and children in the top four globally in 2017 (BBC, 2019). Figure 2 shows South Africa’s amalgamated murder rate from 2010 to 2020. Although these are only the documented murders available through South Africa’s Police Service, a clear trend emerges with increasing

levels of murder. Furthermore, homicides are the 17th leading cause of death globally but the 8th leading cause in South Africa (Roser and Ritchie, 2013).

Unemployment and poverty are two leading social determinants creating the conditions leading Black and coloured community members to gangsterism (Demombynes and Ozler, 2006; Habib and Bentley, 2008). South Africa’s unemployment rate stands at 28.5% in 2020, with those aged 25-35 at 37.3% and 15-24 at 59% (ILO, 2020; Statista, 2020). More than 90% of Cape Town households live on less than \$640 USD per month (Goredema and Goga, 2014), and in 2014 over 55% of South Africans lived below the national poverty line (World Bank). Figure 3 shows the pervasive levels of poverty at the international poverty line and middle poverty lines. These trends are not equitably divided throughout society, as socio-spatial divisions of unemployment and poverty are hardening between

racialized communities (Samara, 2007). In turn, this leads to the criminal economy providing for thousands of socially and economically excluded citizens (Habib, 2003). Organized crime fills employment, material, and service vacuums to the point of creating a quasi-institutional order (Samara, 2011). For many, gangs have become a “surrogate family,” providing a social identity in the face of a collapsing sense of community and belonging (Leggett, 2002; Lambrechts, 2013). Estimates vary, but authorities on gangs claim upwards of 100,000 gang members between 120 gangs within Cape Town, constituting 5% of the city’s population (Samara, 2011). Law and social morality are bifurcated in the Cape Flats, with survival necessitating new norms of behaviour and social order.

### South Africa’s Politics of Crime

The collapse of the apartheid regime in 1994 signalled a new era of law enforcement. The new South African government was faced with transforming the state during a period of high crime and growing feelings of public insecurity (du Plessis and Louw, 2005). The oppressive oligarchy was transformed into a human-rights-based democracy that began a new era of ethical policing to uphold human rights and serve the community (Shaw, 2002). The 1996 National Crime Prevention Strategy (NCPS) was the bedrock of the post-apartheid policing revolution focusing on crime prevention rather than punitive reaction (Shaw and Shearing, 1998). The NCPS was coupled with the 1996 National Growth and Development Strategy (NGDS) that addressed the links between economic development and crime for the first time in South Africa (Rauch, 2001). However, this renewed hope quickly faded when resources were diverted from the “social pillars” of NCPS to crime control, reforming the criminal justice system, and border control (Simpson and Rauch, 1999). Crime preventative strategies rapidly gave way to public calls for a “tough on crime” approach steeped in the militarization of policing, which observed human rights as an obstacle to combating crime (Leggett, 2005). What emerged are racialized zones entrenched on a socio-spatial scale, creating a deeply polarized environment with areas designated as “ungovernable” with “deep-rooted animosity” towards the state (Standing, 2003). South Africa’s contemporary war on crime is a harsh reflection of this reality.

Part of the public push for a punitive approach to crime stems from the public’s perceptions of increasing crime and crime as a barrier to development. The discourse around crime shifted Cape Town’s impoverished communities as problems rather than

survivors of apartheid (Jensen, 2008). Conversations on broader urban renewal saw crime as causing underdevelopment rather than the reverse (Samara, 2011). In contrast to crime statistics, over 50% of South Africans perceived crime as increasing after 1994 and reported feeling substantially less secure (Burton et al., 2004). The business community also cried foul on social crime prevention and immediately established security partnerships, increased surveillance, and called for greater crime control (Pillay, 2008; Samara, 2011). Political pressure mounted on the NCPS’s marginal results, and a “politically marketable” war on crime was established (Dixon and Van der Spuy, 2004). The National Crime Combating Strategy (NCCS) came into effect in 2000, prioritizing punitive crime control and militarizing the discourse on law and order (du Plessis and Louw, 2005; Van der Spuy, 2000). A loss of public faith in the NCPS and NGDS and building support for NCCS are the precursors driving a legacy of war on crime espoused in a reactive law enforcement approach driven by fear and control.

However, security privatization is growing from the public’s loss of trust in the state’s capacity to reduce crime and ensure security. This transition delegitimizes the state’s authority, and private actors fill an eroded power vacuum (Peck, 1999). Private policing grew exponentially for affluent communities, and by 1996, private security guards outnumbered military personnel by more than two to one (Kempa et al., 1999; Malan, 1996). Gated communities expanded in line with the wealthy’s socio-spatial fears of losing their “civilised lifestyle” from post-apartheid changes (Ballard, 2004; Lemanski, 2006). However, more impoverished communities mobilized vigilante anti-crime groups as an informal justice system in response to the state’s failure to reduce crime (Buur and Jensen, 2004). The capacity of state or non-state actors to control crime grew into a foundational source of legitimacy situated at the heart of South African politics.

South Africa’s crime epidemic feeds the discourse on militarized approaches to policing and perpetuating negative public views. A pillar of election campaigns grew from law and order issues weighted on criminal justice policies (Cohen, 1996). As Van der Spuy (2000) notes, crime control is now a central issue of “competitive party politics” in South Africa. Controversially, Ceasefire adopts a social crime prevention approach and is seen by some community members and politicians as experimental and doubt the efficacy of using reformed gangsters to mediate crime reduction (Gonschorek, 2013). Several political leaders fret about Ceasefire’s involvement with the gangs because it may lend legitimacy to illegitimate forms of authority in the community (AfricaNews, 2016). The ANC’s critique of Ceasefire’s political alignments and



**Figure 4.** Map of Cape Town: This Photo by Unknown Author is licensed under CC BY-SA (bright red line is an approximation of Cape Flats and the yellow dot is an approximation of Hanover Park)

engagement with criminals triggered investigations into the program's legitimacy and NGO registration, all of which were cleared (Gonschorek, 2013). Nonetheless, the city pulled the program's funding in 2018 due to unspecified "political issues" (Booyesen, 2018). Ceasefire continued operating without the city's resources and financial aid afterwards. The politics of crime in South Africa fixates on fear-management strategies which prioritize control and containment. Punitive rhetoric normalizes paramilitary policing as an attractive political approach in garnering public support, which lends credence to the ANC's interference in Ceasefire's activities.

### Ceasefire and Social Crime Prevention

Ceasefire adopts a social crime prevention and public health approach to addressing crime in Hanover Park. Social crime prevention focuses on the social, economic, and environmental conditions driving individuals to gangsterism (du Plessis and Louw, 2005). Meeting the community's social and economic needs decouples their dependency on gangs as social and economic providers (Kinnes, 2000). Whole-of-society governance addresses these causal push factors by "flexibly linking different nodes together or drawing on a particular node as the

situation demand[s]" (Berg and Nakueira, 2011). Like the Zwelethemba model, the role of victims and offenders is non-static and part of a larger and longer narrative. Thus, it is imperative to derive a context-sensitive approach while working on the individual level to uncouple cycles of conflict. All parties' dynamic roles create what Kauffman (1996) calls a "coevolutionary environment," and the non-bureaucratic methodology of Ceasefire and similar NGOs can operate meaningfully in these settings. These crime prevention strategies become networks of community partnerships. And in the case of Ceasefire also includes community-based conflict-resolution processes.

Ceasefire began in 2011 in partnership with Cure Violence in the United States, creating a violence prevention program in Hanover Park (Cure Violence Global, n.d.). Figure 4 shows the Cape Flats' boundary approximation and Hanover Park's location. The programme adopts a "public health approach to fighting gun violence" to interrupt the carriers and causes of violence in a community and between gangs (Swano, 2016). Ceasefire uses reformer gangsters as "violence interrupters" to mediate gang and community disputes and operates from the First Community Resource Centre, running several outreach programs (Swano, 2016). The NGO offers "alternative lifestyles and risk-reduction to young high-risk individuals" while building trust with the community through social crime prevention programmes

based on community engagement (Bruckner, n.d.). Part of this approach involves spatial mapping for crime prevention. This includes territorial charting of the community and gangs through their activities to identify “hot spots” for early intervention and allocating resources (Ibid.). Ceasefire employs a program called “ShotSpotter” that uses acoustic sensors set throughout the community to “detect and locate gunfire incidents in real-time” (The Economist, 2020). Mapping and real-time data are both crucial parts of Ceasefire’s public health approach and operations.

Ceasefire operates on a three-part method based on violence interrupters, outreach workers, and changing community norms. Violence interrupters are reformed gang members with credibility in the community and gangs, who are trained with mediative techniques to offer alternative dispute resolution between gangs (First Community Resource Centre, n.d.). Outreach workers are mentors to community participants offering a range of services and access to networking opportunities, such as job training and drug abuse counselling (Ibid.). Ceasefire also engages in community outreach and norm changing through “public education campaign[s], community events, community responses to every shooting, and community mobilization” against the use of violence to resolve conflicts (Ibid.). Ceasefire’s methodology and three-part operation are the major drivers producing the NGO’s results while building trust with the community and gangs.

The Cape Flats is the most volatile part of Cape Town, as crime rates are spatially segregated. Almost 80% of Cape Town’s homicides occurred in the Cape Flats in 2019, and emergency services have refused to enter certain “volatile” areas on occasion (The Economist, 2020). Hanover Park has one of the highest murder rates globally (AJ+, 2016). Guy Lamb’s 2018 report from the University of Cape Town notes the city’s murder rate is 63 per 100,000 people, twice the national rate and 50 percent more than all other major South African cities. The Cape Flats’ criminal economy is just as prevalent. The illicit economy includes “planned murders, extortion, bribery, theft and robbery rackets, and drug and gun syndicates” (Samara, 2011). Illicit money laundering and investments are expanding into “hotels, night clubs, public transport, shops, and commercial fishing boats” too (Standing, 2003). The criminal economy’s comprehensive and expansion network employs tens of thousands of Cape Flats’ residents feeling abandoned by the state and struggling to survive. Furthermore, Brian Williams, a visiting professor at the University of the Sacred Heart Gulu in Uganda, estimates up to 500 youth could be classified as “child soldiers” in Hanover Park, with upwards of 7,000 active gang members in the community (Oliver, 2020).

Despite the systemic and pervasive challenges in the Cape Flats and Hanover Park, Ceasefire produces unprecedented results. Cure Violence’s partnership with Ceasefire from 2012 to 2015 reduced shootings by 53% and killings by 31% locally (Cure Violence Global, n.d.). Former Director of the University of Cape Town’s Centre for Criminology, Professor Mark Shaw, notes Ceasefire is one means of engaging with people in gangsterism with some “credibility, who can reach across the divide which the city would otherwise struggle to do” (AfricaNews, 2016). Ceasefire has helped over 700 gangsters leave gangsterism to become community activists since the program’s inception in 2012 (The Economist, 2020). The combination of street credibility with the gangs and trust in the community provides a credible messenger bridging a divide diplomatically. A pressing question to explore is how other programs and services can expand or replicate Ceasefire’s model of success creating networks of micro-institutions.

As mentioned, the politics of crime in South Africa renders Ceasefire as a politically unattractive model in a game of competitive party politics. Ceasefire’s social prevention model prompted the ANC to investigate and eventually defund the program in 2018. These actions are politically motivated due to Ceasefire’s initial success and infringement of the political party’s sought legitimacy through punitive crime control policies garnering broader public support. And Ceasefire’s method is notably eschewed because it is politically unmarketable to the wider public, yet the program effectively reduces crime and keeps people out of gangsterism. Social crime prevention focuses on the roots of organized crime rather than the outcomes that punitive crime control orients towards. Dependency on police to reduce crime levels instigates social unrest, and issues inherently about human security cannot be solved through “military-style stabilisation” (Samara, 2011). The NCCS gave way to the NCCS and marked the beginning of a punitive crime control legacy in the post-apartheid era. This is not arguing that the models these policies represent are incompatible but that practical problem-solving will require a commitment to both these avenues. Successful evidence-based practices cannot be ignored or discredited for political purposes, as is happening with Ceasefire.

## CONCLUSION

South Africa’s criminal and public milieu is largely a continuation of apartheid’s legacy rather than a transformation of “institutional and social practices” (Turok, 2001). It is not an intractable climate, but the pressure to reduce crime can undermine crime

prevention. The Institute for Security Studies (2019) discovered increasing policing and stiffer sentences are not reducing South Africa's levels of violence. Crime prevention could be more effective and cheaper than reacting to criminality over time (Klein, 2019). Social control exerted through the prison system and aggressive policing of crime and gangsterism produce a discursive image of a "black menace" undermining development in South Africa (Ehlers and Tait, 2016; Samara, 2005). These images are harmful to South Africa's most vulnerable populations and undermine post-apartheid reconciliation. These pejorative stereotypes of impoverished communities of colour harbouring a criminogenic nature only further feed into punitive calls to control crime. Social crime prevention is a crucial step to humanely address the drivers of crime while being sensitive to context without perpetuating further injustices. Ceasefire and the First Community Resource Centre are leading the way in this regard. They are creating innovative and effective change for some of South Africa's most precarious and vulnerable communities. Violence Interrupters are like guerrilla diplomats operating in volatile and often unreachable locations for the state. Ceasefire exemplifies a pioneering approach adopted in Cape Town with proven success. Social crime prevention, including community-based conflict resolution and programs to address the Cape Flats' residents' structural socioeconomic challenges, is critical. And Ceasefire's community outreach workers are the strings connecting nodes of governance and services in an approach to nodal governance. Not only can this serve as a resource for healing community trauma and grievances, but as a messenger crossing the broader social fragmentation between racialized and spatialized suburbs. Criminal structures are pervasive and a lifeline for thousands, but this is not where the story must end for Cape Flats' residents steeped in gangsterism. Ceasefire provides a ray of hope where punitive approaches to crime management have continuously failed, and Ceasefire can start the beginning of restoring justice for thousands by devolving power and empowering citizens in their own lives.

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